Migration: New Developments
Spring 2013

NORFACE Research Programme on Migration
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About NORFACE

NORFACE – New Opportunities for Research Funding Co-operation in Europe – is a partnership between 15 research councils to increase co-operation in research and research policy in Europe. The partners involved are the research councils for the social sciences from Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Canada and Austria participate in NORFACE as associate partners. NORFACE is an ambitious programme of communication, enquiry, sharing of experience and action. The work plan follows a logical progression from putting in place governance and good management of the NORFACE network to information exchange, analysis, research co-operation, strategic thinking and, finally, co-operation on two pilot programmes and the launch of a full-scale transnational research programme on migration. NORFACE receives core funding from the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme under the ERA-NET scheme.

NORFACE Migration

The NORFACE research programme on migration comprises 12 research projects and is jointly funded by the national research councils and the European Commission. The total funding for the programme is approximately €28 million, including €6 million funding from the EC. Each of the 12 projects consists of research teams from at least three NORFACE countries. The programme was launched in June 2009 and will run until the end of 2013. The scientific co-ordinator of the programme is Professor Christian Dustmann, UCL/CReAM.

The NORFACE Migration initiative emphasises three main themes:

- Migration
- Integration
- Cohesion and Conflict

The programme has the following main objectives:

- To globally advance excellent theoretical and methodological disciplinary, inter-disciplinary and comparative research on migration that builds synergetically on a pan-European basis
- To take advantage of and develop the present informal laboratory of experience, knowledge and data currently presented by migration in Europe
- To motivate and support excellence and capacity-building for research on migration on a cross-national basis throughout the NORFACE countries and beyond
- To develop understanding and promote research-based knowledge and insight into migration for issues of societal, practical and policy relevance, based on theory but worked on jointly with relevant users and experts

List of Migration Projects

Details of the 12 research projects within the Norface Migration Programme are available on the NORFACE Migration programme web site: www.norface-migration.org/currentprojects.php.

The projects and their acronyms are as follows:

- CHOICES – Understanding Migrants’ Choices
- CILS4EU – Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries
- IMEM – Integrated Modelling of European Migration
- LineUp – 500 Families: Migration Histories of Turks in Europe
- MIDI-REDIE – Migrant Diversity and Regional Disparity in Europe
- MI3 – Migration: Integration, Impact and Interaction
- NODES – Nordic Welfare States and the Dynamics and Effects of Ethnic Residential Segregation
- SCIP – Causes and Consequences of Early Socio-cultural Integration Processes Among New Immigrants in Europe
- SIMCUR – Social Integration of Migrant Children: Uncovering Family and School Factors Promoting Resilience
- TEMPO – Temporary Migration, Integration and the role of Policies
- TCRAf-Eu - Transnational Child-rearing Arrangements between Africa and Europe
- THEMIS – Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Studies
The NORFACE Migration research programme “Migration in Europe – Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics” has had another exciting and productive year. The twelve projects of the programme continued to pursue ambitious research agendas in the area of migration, integration and social cohesion. Nine projects have conducted innovative primary data collection, through both quantitative surveys and qualitative and in-depth case studies. The projects that collect primary data have begun to produce the first research papers based on this data.

This second issue of NORFACE Compact Migration: New Developments reviews a selection of both on-going and completed studies. The variety of topics covered is a testament to the breadth and the complexity of issues addressed in the Norface migration programme, ranging from migrants’ decision to the welfare of their children and other family members to the effects on sending and receiving communities and countries.

The second edition of NORFACE Compact reports on research such as the impact of migrant networks and social media on migration decisions, communication flows and remittance behaviour, education and well-being of migrants’ children, the impact of immigration on productivity, wages, and urban development, and the role of immigration and welfare policies in shaping population flows. The detailed research is provided in the form of discussion papers on the programme web site – http://norface-migration.org. On the web site further information is provided about the various programme activities.

We look forward to the final year of the NORFACE Migration Initiative and we hope that you enjoy reading the second issue of NORFACE Compact Migration: New Developments.

Best wishes,

Prof. Christian Dustmann
Research Director, NORFACE Programme on Migration
The “Children of Immigrants” Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries: A unique data source for current migration research

By Jörg Dollmann, Konstanze Jacob, Carina Mood, Meenakshi Parameshwaran and Sanne Smith

Motivation and contribution to contemporary research on migration and integration issues

The “Children of Immigrants” Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) offers new pathways for studying the integration processes of immigrant children in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data collected so far provide rich information with which to tackle key questions in the research on migration and integration. Most particularly, they connect fine-grained measures of ethnicity and migration background to a wide variety of indicators of different integration dimensions and are supplemented by additional thematic modules that allow more in-depth analyses on specific aspects. For example, the assessment of complete classroom networks answers questions about social integration in one of young people’s most important contexts, while the achievement tests objectively measure aspects of cognitive-cultural and structural integration. Because implementation of these measures is identical in each participating countries, it also enables strict comparison across both groups and countries. Likewise, the parental questionnaires capture several aspects of parents’ cognitive-cultural, structural, social and emotional-cultural integration, which allows direct testing of intergenerational transmission and integration processes through an analysis of parent-child dyads. Finally, all the measures are supplemented by rich information on the school and neighbourhood context, allowing for highly detailed multi-level analyses. The following discussion outlines some of the exemplary work in progress by CILS4EU team researchers, all of which exploits the strengths of this unique data.

The new immigrant health paradox: mental well-being from a comparative perspective

Carina Mood, Jan O. Jonsson and Sara Brolin Låftman are taking advantage of the data’s comparative potential to assess cross-group and cross-country differences in the mental well-being of immigrants. More precisely, the researchers are investigating the so-called immigrant health paradox, the fact that immigrants and their descendants usually report systematically higher well-being than the majority population. Their results so far support this paradox: all immigrant groups outperform their majority peers, with immigrants from Africa reporting the highest level of mental well-being. Besides group differences, they observe country differences in overall mental well-being that suggest a slightly positive role of welfare state commitment, with Sweden at the top of the ranking, followed by the Netherlands, Germany and England.

Immigrant duration of residence and language proficiency

Using the results of the language achievement test, Meenakshi Parameshwaran identifies a clear positive effect of immigrants’ length of residence on the acquisition of, and proficiency in, the survey country language. She also observes contextual effects in which school composition seems important; that is, a higher share of longer residing students in the student’s school and class promotes individual language proficiency above and beyond individual characteristics.

Intergenerational change in religious salience among immigrant families in four European countries

Konstanze Jacob and Frank Kalter are addressing the question of intergenerational change in religiosity as a major aspect of emotional-cultural integration. Their results demonstrate considerable stability of religiosity in Muslim immigrant families, which contrasts with a clear trend of secularisation in Christian immigrants, for whom the importance of religion declines between generations and shifts towards the level of religiosity typical of the majority population in the respective survey country. Figure 1 illustrates these results, which are quite consistent across the four countries.

Figure 1: Religious salience of natives and immigrants by immigrant generation

Note: Scores from a four-point Likert scale (ranging from “not at all important” to “very important”, recoded to a range from 0–1) for the question “How important is religion to you?” reported on the y-axis; synthetic generations are displayed on the x-axis.
Unlike other studies that make similar comparisons of synthetic generations, however, these researchers extend their analysis to parent-child dyads, which enables them to identify the reasons for intergenerational change or stability. In doing so, they are able to demonstrate that interfamilial change in religiosity may be only weakly related to assimilation processes in other integration dimensions, a finding that underscores the special role of religion in inter-generational integration processes.

These descriptive results suggest that the composition of the social context per se is not the only determinant of the evolution of interethnic friendship ties: other class-level factors besides individual explanations of tie formation may also be relevant. For example, a higher average socioeconomic status of students within classes is associated with fewer ethnic homophilous friendships and thus seems to enhance ethnically diverse friendship formation.

Conditions of ethnic threat and indifference: how classroom characteristics can drive ethnic homophilous friendship choices

Sanne Smith and Frank van Tubergen, in collaboration with Daniel McFarland (Stanford University), use the data on complete classroom networks to study immigrants’ social integration; in particular, the preconditions of homophilous friendship relations. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the relation between ethnic diversity and interethnic friendships in school classes varies considerably. Even though a slight positive relation is observable between the ethnic composition of the school class and the ethnic composition of the friendship network, classes similar in composition can be very different to the extent that pupils cross ethnic boundaries in friendship formation.

Figure 2: Relation between interethnic density and ethnic diversity

These descriptive results suggest that the composition of the social context per se is not the only determinant of the evolution of interethnic friendship ties: other class-level factors besides individual explanations of tie formation may also be relevant. For example, a higher average socioeconomic status of students within classes is associated with fewer ethnic homophilous friendships and thus seems to enhance ethnically diverse friendship formation.

Future prospects

As these examples of current work show, the analyses conducted by the CILS4EU project team are already answering major questions in the research on migration and integration. Yet this work is only preliminary: the real strength of the project will be evident once analysis begins of the data already collected from survey waves two and three. The resulting longitudinal analyses will address methodological shortcomings related to causality between the different integration dimensions. In particular, the repeated measurement of classroom networks will enable assessment of the extent of, and possible changes in, the success of immigrant children’s social integration within one of these young people’s most important contexts. All these points underscore the exceptional contribution of the CILS4EU data for future research on the integration of young immigrants in Western Europe.

Figure 2: Relation between interethnic density and ethnic diversity

Reference:

More information about the CILS4EU Project is available at: www.norface-migration.org/currentprojectdetail.php?proj=2
The success of immigrant children in school

By Uta Schönberg

Whereas the economic success of ethnic minority adults in the labour market has been extensively studied, achievement gaps in school between ethnic minority children and children from the majority group have received far less attention. Yet large achievement gaps at early ages, because they can lead to large imbalances in the labour market many years later, are a key issue of the public policy debate.

The immigrant-native achievement gap in the UK

Recent research by Christian Dustmann, Stephen Machin, and Uta Schönberg from the MI3 team documents and evaluates explanations of achievement gaps between ethnic minority and White British-born children in England, the country with the largest and most diverse population of ethnic minority inhabitants in Europe. Specifically, this research concentrates on six main ethnic minority groups: Black Caribbean, Black non-Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese. Just before the start of school, at ages 3 and 5, ethnic minority children from all groups significantly perform worse than White British-born pupils in early cognitive tests. By the end of compulsory schooling at age 15/16, however, most ethnic minority groups have caught up (Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Black non-Caribbean pupils) or even overtaken (Indian and Chinese pupils) White British pupils. The study thus draws a positive picture of the progress of most minority pupils along England’s compulsory curriculum.

One important reason for ethnic minority children’s lagging behind their native peers at young ages is their lack of knowledge of the English language. Language is also the single most important contributor to the progress of ethnic minority pupils relative to White British pupils, accounting for up to two-thirds of the relative progress. The researchers also find that the relative progress of ethnic minority pupils is particularly pronounced in poor schools, which, they argue, may be partly related to teacher incentives to concentrate attention on particular pupils, an incentive possibly generated and exacerbated by the publication of school league tables.

The importance of the neighbourhood: evidence from Sweden

In related research, Olof Aslund, Per-Enders Edin, Peter Fredriksson and Hans Grönqvist from the MI3 team examine to what extent the performance of immigrant children in school is affected by the characteristics of the neighbourhood in which they grow up. To identify causal effects, this study exploits a refugee placement policy in Sweden that created exogenous variation in the refugees’ initial place of residence.

The study first asks whether immigrant children perform better or worse in school if they live in a neighbourhood with a larger community of immigrants from their own ethnic group. Theoretically, the answer to this question is unclear: although ethnic concentration may improve the labour market outcomes of adult immigrants (potentially boosting their children’s school performance) if the ethnic community provides useful information about job opportunities to newly arrived immigrants, a larger ethnic community may hinder immigrant children’s incentives to learn the majority language and integrate into the host country. The researchers also investigate whether the quality of the ethnic community matters; for instance, the possibility that highly educated peers might act as role models or that peers with poor socio-economic status could negatively influence teenage immigrants.

Their main finding is that the quality of the ethnic community does indeed have a positive impact on immigrant children’s school performance: a one standard deviation increase in the share of highly educated adults of the same ethnic group in the neighbourhood raises school GPA at age 16 by 0.8 percentile ranks. The age 16 GPA is also positively impacted by the size of the ethnic community. Interestingly, this effect that is strongest for immigrant children from a disadvantaged background whose families are most likely to sort to ethnically concentrated areas.

Overall, these results suggest that plans which randomly allocate immigrant families to neighbourhoods and restrict their possibilities to move—a policy that is and has been in place in several countries—may hamper the school performance of immigrant children from a disadvantaged background.

References:

Immigrant children and classroom spill-over effects

By Jan C. van Ours and Asako Ohinata

The large inflow of immigrants to Europe in past decades has drawn considerable attention to the issue of immigrants’ impact on the labour market outcomes of both immigrants and natives. Now that immigrants are a substantial part of the population, however, the research focus is shifting towards assessing the educational performance of immigrant children, sometimes in comparison to native children. Nevertheless, the question of whether immigrant children affect native children’s educational outcomes remains largely unanswered. Hence, to fill this gap, Asako Ohinata and Jan van Ours from the TEMPO team are exploring whether the presence of immigrant children in the classroom affects the educational attainment of native Dutch children in that classroom.

Studying the educational performance of young children using data from PIRLS and TIMSS

The investigation is based on data from the 2001 and 2006 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the 1995 and 2007 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), both designed and carried
out by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Although PIRLS assesses reading abilities, while TIMSS collects information on mathematics and science abilities, both evaluations share similar characteristics. The student samples in both surveys, for example, were selected using a two-stage sampling design that first selected at least 150 schools and then randomly sampled one or more fourth grade classes from each. Likewise the test scores for both PIRLS and TIMSS have been standardised to an international mean of 500 with a standard deviation of 100. Also, a similar set of covariates is available for each. Both data sets record relevant school characteristics, including class sizes; the number of days spent for instruction in each subject; teachers’ years of experience, age and gender; and the population sizes in the regions in which the schools are located. At the individual student level, PIRLS and TIMSS also provide information on student age and gender and the number of books at home, although only PIRLS records the highest educational qualifications of parents.

Exploiting the variation in classroom differences within the same school

One particular focus of the analysis is the spill-over effects of the classroom share of first-generation immigrant students on the educational attainment of native Dutch students in the same classroom. If immigrant students are randomly allocated to schools, the spill-over effects of immigrant students can simply be identified by comparing schools with different shares of immigrant students. Assessing such effects, however, becomes more complex in the absence of the random (immigrant) student allocation assumption. Ohinata and Van Ours address this issue of non-random immigrant allocation across schools by exploiting the variation in the proportion of immigrant students across classes within the same school. Identifying the spill-over effects then only requires that students be randomly allocated to classes within the same school and that teaching resources be allocated independent of the immigrant share in the classroom. The preliminary analyses do in fact confirm that the within-school allocation is indeed random and the teaching resources are unrelated to immigrant share.

The impact of immigrant child presence on native children

In the main part of their analysis, Ohinata and Van Ours find that the presence of immigrant students in the same learning environment has very limited and insignificant impacts on the Dutch students’ academic achievements. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of immigrant students in the class reduces the average Dutch students’ reading score by only 0.21% of the standard deviation in reading scores. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrant students reduces the science score by 0.40% but increases the math score by 0.74% of the standard deviation of the score distribution. They also find that female students perform better in reading tests but worse in maths and science, and that the more books children have at home, the better they perform on their tests. Teachers’ teaching experience, on the other hand, seems to matter little, although the results do suggest that older teachers enhance students’ reading scores, while younger teachers seem to be better at teaching maths and science classes. Overall, the researchers find no strong evidence of negative spill-over effects of immigrant children’s test scores on native Dutch children: all relevant parameter estimates are small and insignificant. The researchers therefore conclude that there is no urgent need to redistribute immigrant children more evenly across classrooms because native students’ educational attainment is unaffected by immigrant children’s presence.

Reference:

Socioeconomic status in relation to parenting and child outcomes in Turkish minority families in the Netherlands

By Judi Mesman, Mariëlle Prevoo, Rosanneke Emmen, Maike Malda, Nihal Yeniad, Marinus van IJzendoorn.

In most societies, ethnic minority families tend to have lower socioeconomic status (SES) than majority families. A low SES, however, is in turn associated with less positive parenting, lower levels of language input and subsequently poorer child outcomes.

The Family Stress Model and the Family Investment Model

According to the Family Stress Model, economic pressures increase parental stress, which in turn predicts lower quality parenting. Ethnic minority families may experience not only heightened stress related to economic difficulties but also stressors specific to their minority status, including the acculturation stress shown to negatively affect parenting quality. Nevertheless, despite some evidence that acculturation stress is more pronounced in families from lower SES backgrounds – possibly because they have fewer coping resources – the link between SES, acculturation stress and parenting is rarely investigated. The Family Investment Model, in contrast, predicts that low SES families have fewer resources in several areas that prevent them from investing in child development through cognitive stimulation in general and language input in particular. It remains unclear, however, to what extent such models apply to ethnic versus host language development.

The SIMCUR Study in the Netherlands

The SIMCUR Study in the Netherlands tests the Family Stress Model in a sample of Turkish-Dutch mothers, taking into account both general family stress and the stress specific to ethnic minority families. It also tests certain language-specific aspects of the model by investigating the relation between family SES, mother’s language use, home reading input and children’s vocabulary. To gather data, the SIMCUR researchers paid home visits to 111 Turkish minority mothers of 5- to 6-year-old children living in the Netherlands and videotaped the mothers and children working together on a problem-solving task. The task
was slightly too difficult for the children, so it required the mother’s help and guidance. The videotapes were coded and assigned quantitative scores for positive parenting using a standardised observational instrument on which a team of students had received extensive training. In this context, positive parenting refers to mothers who show positive affect towards their children, respond to their needs, give them space to explore and provide clear instructions when needed. There is substantial evidence that this constellation of parenting behaviours predicts positive child developmental outcomes across ethnic groups. The additional variables of maternal general stress, acculturation stress, reading activities and language use were measured using questionnaires filled in by the mothers. The children also performed several tests on a laptop, one of which measured their Dutch and Turkish vocabulary. Family SES was based on gross annual family income and the highest completed educational level of both parents.

**An Ethnic Minority Family Stress Model**

In terms of stress and parenting, the analytic results indicate that mothers from lower SES backgrounds experience more general and more acculturation stress, both of which predict lower levels of observed positive parenting and significantly mediate the relation between positive parenting and socio-economic status (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Family SES in relation to stress and parenting in Turkish minority families

These results confirm the applicability of the Family Stress Model to ethnic minority families, but also underscore the need to take minority-specific processes into account. That is, less positive parenting in ethnic minority populations is a result not only of generally lower SES and related economic stressors but also of stressors specific to ethnic minority status – in this case acculturation stress, which is more common in lower SES families. Parenting interventions must therefore consider these specific processes if they are to fully understand the parenting context of ethnic minority families.

**Language-specific family investment models**

Almost half the mothers surveyed reported speaking an equal amount of Dutch and Turkish with their child, with less than one tenth admitting more conversations in Turkish than in Dutch. On average, children received more input in Dutch than Turkish, both orally from the mother and through reading and the availability of books. Fathers provided the least reading input in both languages. In families with a higher SES, mothers generally used more Dutch than Turkish when speaking to their child, and the children received more reading input in Dutch. Children’s vocabulary in either language was also generally higher if mothers used that language more when speaking to them or if they received more reading input in that language. If fathers used more Turkish than Dutch for reading at home, the children’s Turkish vocabulary was generally higher regardless of the amount of reading with the father. SES also influenced the children’s vocabulary via its effect on language use and reading input. Reading input was most important for explaining differences in the children’s Dutch vocabulary, whereas the general language use of the mother with the child was more important for their Turkish vocabulary (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Family SES in relation to language and reading input and vocabulary in Dutch and Turkish

For example, paying extra attention to coping strategies that deal with acculturation pressures and even more general stressors may facilitate positive parenting in these families.
The greater input of Dutch over Turkish may stem from the fact that Dutch reading materials are simply more easily accessible or more highly promoted than Turkish ones, or that children invite more reading input in Dutch because it is the language used at school. As regards its wider use among more highly educated parents, these may find it easier to provide input in Dutch and/or might value the development of this language more because they know its importance from their own experiences with the Dutch educational system. The important point is that, across all socio-economic statuses, advising parents to read with their children can have a positive effect for the host as well as the ethnic language. The findings also imply that, during the transition to formal reading education, extra attention should be given to children from families with lower SES because they receive less input in Dutch, which could be a risk factor for the development of their vocabulary and reading skills.

What can families do?

Studies on monolingual children have established that vocabulary development is connected to the availability of books, parental reading and storybook reading to the child, factors that together make up the “literacy environment”. The picture is less clear, however, for immigrant families because issues like the effect on children’s vocabulary of the language used in storybook reading remains virtually unexplored. Does storybook reading in German, for instance, have any effect at all on Turkish vocabulary?

To date, the SIMCUR researchers have uncovered two important findings. First, the literacy environment is connected only to the Turkish vocabulary of pre-school age children; for older children, it simply does not matter, which implies that families trying to support their children’s heritage language development should use different strategies dependent on age. Second, and most surprising, for the pre-schoolers, it made no difference whether they were read to in German or Turkish. This finding, although it needs further verification, indicates that children may profit from a stimulating home environment regardless of the language used to provide such stimulation.

Family background: resources and threats to the heritage language

In another step, the SIMCUR team is examining how family background characteristics are associated with resources and threats to the heritage language. For non-immigrant families, the single most important factor is socio-economic status, which, being inherently associated with the amount and type of verbal stimulation children receive from their parents, is consistently connected to children’s language development. For immigrant families, however, this situation is complicated by the parents’ generational status: being first- or second-generation immigrants influences how well the parents speak the heritage language and how often they use it.

One observation from the SIMCUR study underscores the complexity of the connections between family background and resources for the family language; namely, that one single background characteristic, such as mother’s generational status or father’s educational attainment, can be simultaneously associated with both resources for and threats to Turkish vocabulary. In the case of the former, for example, pre-schoolers with first-generation mothers generally had larger Turkish vocabularies, presumably because the mothers used more Turkish with them. However, at the same time, first-generation mothers were less likely to provide a stimulating literacy environment for their children. For elementary school children, in contrast, it was only the father’s and not the mother’s educational attainment that was connected with Turkish vocabulary, an unexpected finding given that studies of language development frequently use mother’s education as a proxy for family SES. Doing so, however, prevents examination of an issue that the SIMCUR results only hint at: whether and in what way fathers take a special role in their children’s language development.

Reference:


Heritage languages: why are they important and what can families do to maintain them?

By Jessica Willard and Birgit Leyendecker

Struggling to maintain a heritage language

When researchers refer to the U.S as a “language graveyard”, they are referring to the rapid and merciless ‘death’ – usually within a few generations – of the multitude of languages that immigrants bring with them from their home countries. Dutch, Italian, and Polish are just a few examples of languages that have practically perished in the U.S., even though not long ago they were spoken by large immigrant communities. Countless immigrant families have first-hand experience of how hard it is to maintain a heritage language after settling into a new society. Yet research provides clear evidence that families may be rewarded by taking on this challenge: not only can children who learn and use both the majority language and their immigrant parents’ language experience a better parent-child relationship, but bilingual children outperform monolingual children on certain cognitive skills and may also have an edge over monolingual children in their socio-emotional development.

Despite these potential advantages, however, the task of teaching children their heritage language too often fails to the families. Hence, researchers from the SIMCUR project in Germany, using Turkish as the heritage language, are investigating which family background characteristics and behaviours are associated with vocabulary size. This topic is important because having a sizeable vocabulary in any particular language is not only essential for everyday communication but also lays the groundwork for learning to read and understand texts.
Strengthening families

Many immigrant families, although very enthusiastic about passing on their heritage language, are unsure of how to do so. The SIMCUR findings suggest several possible pathways. For younger children, storybook reading, the availability of books and parents as reading role models provide promising avenues for maintaining the heritage language. Ways to support heritage language development in older children, however, need further exploration and evaluation, especially given the enormous draw of the majority language during the school years.

What is clear is that if the social majority wants to support families, interventions should be specifically tailored to the targeted age group. They should also take into account that, whereas some families may simply need to recognise themselves as the key actors in passing on their heritage language (because abandoning its home use leaves little chance for their children to learn it), others may need to be made aware of how to provide stimulating language activities. Above all, therefore, it is imperative that immigrant families be provided with information on how to successfully pass on to their children a heritage they hold so dear: their language.

Reference:

Transnational child-rearing arrangements (TCRAs): emotional well-being outcomes for children in Ghana, Nigeria and Angola

By Valentina Mazzucato and Victor Cebotari

Increasing migration from the global South to the North has led to a rising number of transnational families in which one or both parents migrate nationally or internationally leaving the children in the origin country with a caregiver. Yet, despite the prevalence of such transnational child-rearing arrangements (TCRAs), to date they have attracted little systematic research and barely any in a comparative framework. The TCRAf-Eu project aims to fill this void by using mixed-methods data from three African and three European countries to study the effects of TCRAs on three different sets of involved actors: migrant parents, their children and the caregivers in the origin country. The discussion below outlines our recent findings on one type of effect studied: the emotional well-being of children and youths living in TCRAs in the three African countries of Ghana, Nigeria and Angola.

By using cross-country comparative data on the emotional well-being of African children that stay in their origin country while their parents migrate either nationally or internationally, TCRAf-Eu contributes a cross-country African perspective to a literature that is largely based on qualitative case studies from Asia and Latin America. This African focus is especially important because the family norms in many African societies differ greatly from those in the standard nuclear family model; especially, in terms of child-fostering and social parenthood practices. These differences may affect the way parents, children and caregivers experience life in a transnational family.

Characteristics and effects of transnational child-rearing arrangements

The data were collected from school children and youths between the ages of 11 and 21 living in an African country with both biological parents (control group, non-TCRA) or having at least one parent who had migrated nationally or internationally (treatment group, TCRA). The analytic focus was whether being in a transnational family influences children's emotional well-being and if so, what characteristics of the TCRA are associated with the observed outcomes.

The children's emotional well-being was assessed using the Total Difficulties Score (TDS) of the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), an index consisting of 20 self-reported emotional symptoms (e.g., feeling angry, worrying a lot, constantly fighting, having friends). TCRAs are measured based on four main characteristics – which parent migrates, international versus nation migration, type of caregiver and TCRA stability – some already identified as potentially important in the qualitative literature; others explored for the first time. The results for the key TCRA characteristics, with child socio-demographic, parental social and marital status, living conditions and school contextual factors controlled for, are reported below.

Which parent migrates

The importance of whether the mother, father or both migrate(s) for the emotional well-being of the children differs across the three countries (Figure 5). In Ghana, children are more emotionally distressed when either their father or their mother migrates compared to children living in the country with both parents. In Nigeria, children are more emotionally distressed when their mothers migrate and they are left living with their fathers. Only for Angola do the results indicate that children with the mother, father or both parents away are more emotionally challenged than children living in the country with both parents. These cross-country variations, however, do highlight one important observation: parental migration does not always lead to worse emotional outcomes for children. This finding is counter to those reported in the qualitative literature from Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, which emphasises predominantly negative consequences. These studies, however, unlike ours, do not nuance the differences according to TCRA type. Nor do they account for the fact that in many West African countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, having children raised by relatives is a common parenting practice, which may ease the emotional discomfort of children separated from one or both of their migrant parents.
The negative well-being outcomes of mothers migrating in all three countries may result from the mother’s absence; or from the fact the father who is raising the child might not be able to give the child the care needed for their emotional well-being; or from migrant mothers facing more difficult circumstance overseas whereby they are not able to support their children emotionally at a distance in the same way as fathers are. More research needs to be conducted to understand the mechanisms underlying these results.

Figure 5: Effects of parental migration status on the emotional well-being (TDS) of school children in Nigeria, Angola and Ghana.

The higher the value, the lower the well-being.


Note: The figure is based on the coefficients of multiple regression results; significant results are presented as solid-filled bars. The higher the value, the lower the well-being.

The different effects of internal versus international migration

This study, possibly the first to compare national and international migration in terms of the emotional effects on children, identifies clear differences between the two migration types. Most particularly, children with parents away internationally (Ghana, Angola, Nigeria) – and in one case, nationally (Angola) – experience more emotional distress than children living with both parents in the country of origin (Figure 6). This finding implies that distance matters. In fact, the researchers find that communication via telephone differs little between national and international migrant parents, but, because of the high expense of travel – and for undocumented parents, its impossibility – the frequency of visits is much lower for international migrants. Accordingly, there is more emotional distress for children who are separated from their parents by international migration.

Figure 6: Effects of migrant parents’ location on the emotional well-being (TDS) of school children in Nigeria, Angola and Ghana.


Note: The figure is based on the coefficients of multiple regression results; significant results are presented as solid-filled bars. The higher the value, the lower the well-being.

Type of caregiver

The effects on children’s well-being also differ according to type of caregiver. There is no empirical evidence for either Ghana or Nigeria that children living with close relatives (uncles, aunts, grandparents) are more negatively affected in terms of emotional well-being than children living with both parents (Figure 7). This counters the qualitative studies in Latin America and Asia that report difficulties by grandparents who are too old to care for children and too weak to discipline them especially in their teenage years; uncles and aunts as not having time to give children the same attention as their biological parents. Moreover, the counter-intuitive finding for Ghana and Nigeria that children living with non-migrant parent are worse off can be explained by the qualitative in-depth case studies of TCRA conducted by the researchers, which identify a potential for tension between parents when one migrates while the other stays.

The Angolan case, on the other hand, is more complex: Angolan children living in almost all types of caregiving settings are more prone to emotional distress than non-TCRA children. Angolan society, however, is still affected by and recovering from the recent civil war, which led to broken family structures. These conflict-generated issues and the accelerated urbanisation rates over the last decade may be the source of the poor emotional well-being of children living in various caregiving settings.
These findings point to the importance of examining the different transnational family characteristics that can have diverse effects on children’s well-being. Above all, it is far too simplistic to conclude that living transnationally always has negative consequences. This study, by highlighting which characteristics lead to negative well-being outcomes, provides a first step towards identifying potential areas for intervention in order to reduce negative outcomes for children. Two of the most important factors, seemingly, are the presence of one stable caregiver and the opportunity for children and parents to have face-to-face contact during their separation. Another important finding is that the effects of TCRA characteristics on children can vary across countries depending on each country’s particular context. For example, the child fostering and social parenthood norms in Ghana and Nigeria, which commonly include child-rearing by a relative irrespective of whether a parent has migrated, partially explain the fact that a kin relative as caregiver has no negative outcomes for children in those countries. In Angola, on the other hand, the post-conflict setting seems to dominate the emotional well-being of children living in TCRA, irrespective of who the caregiver is.

**References:**


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**Stability of child-rearing arrangements**

The results for Ghana, Nigeria and Angola do indicate a negative link between the frequency of caregiver change-over and children’s emotional well-being (Figure 8): children whose caregiver changes two or more times in their lifetime have a greater likelihood of developing more emotional problems than children whose caregiver never changes. Hence, the empirical evidence points to the importance of a stable caregiving arrangement for children in transnational families and echoes the family sociology findings for non-migrant families in Western contexts. Until now, however, this characteristic remained unexplored in the context of transnational families.

**Figure 8: Effects of caregiving arrangement stability on the emotional well-being (TDS) of school children in Nigeria, Angola, and Ghana.**


Note: The figure is based on the coefficients of multiple regression results; significant results are presented as solid-filled bars. The higher the value, the lower the well-being.
Regional origins of Poles in four destinations

By Marcel Lubbers and Monika Kaliszewska

Data for the “Early Socio-Cultural Integration Processes among Recent Migrants” project (SCIP) were collected through interviews with 4,000 Polish migrants in four participating countries: Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland. In these latter two countries, however, migrants were sampled only in the two capital cities of London and Dublin. To enable comparison of the regional origins of Poles migrating to these four destinations, respondents were asked in which city they lived before migration, and, if outside an urban area, in which voivodeship (province). Although Warsaw is the largest Polish city with a population of over one million – followed by Krakow, Lodz, Wroclaw and Poznan with populations between a half and one million – it is not the source location for most migrants in the study.

Polish migrants to Germany and the Netherlands from the West of the origin country, to the UK from the East

The cross-country differences in Polish migrants’ regional origins in each of the destination countries are illustrated by four corresponding maps of Poland that show provincial breakdowns by percentage (see Figure 9). In Germany, most of the migrants originate from bordering south-western Lower Silesia (12.6%), followed by the Krakow region known as Lesser Poland, and the West Pomeranian region in the north-west. Among Poles migrating to the Netherlands, two regions account for more than 10% of the migrant share. As in the German case, many migrants originate from Lower Silesia (12.4%); however, the majority come from Silesia in the south of Poland (19%), and the Opolskie region in the south-west is more often an origin region than in the other destination countries. The Polish migrants to London come mainly from south-east Poland, although the distribution is more equally spread across the provinces, with no province accounting for more than 10%. In Dublin, Ireland, most migrants originate from Krakow (Lesser Poland) followed by Warsaw (Mazovia). Again, however, these figures represent only the two capital cities; other regions of Poland may have had a higher representation if other major cities had been included.

Relating the origin of Polish migrants to the population size of the regions of origin

Since the population of Poland is not equally distributed over the provinces (Warsaw’s province Mazovia is the most populated, with a little over 5 million; Lubuskie, on the western border with Germany, is the least populated with only 1 million inhabitants), Figure 10 presents the share of migrants from a province in the total of migrants to a destination to the share of the population of a province in the total population of Poland. A value of 1 means that the province is equally represented among the migrants to a particular destination compared to the province’s share in the total population of Poland. A value above 1 signifies an over-representation of migrants from that region, and a value below 1 an under-representation relative to the number of inhabitants in that province. In each of the destinations, there are fewer migrants from the central Lodz region than could be expected if migrants had originated from all provinces equally. The same holds true for the Warsaw province except in the case of Dublin, Ireland. The province of Lower Silesia is over-represented in all destinations except London.

It is also evident that all the border regions are over-represented among the Polish migrants to Germany, suggesting the role of distance and the possible effects on Poles of pre-migration trips to Germany. For historical reasons, these regions also have a relatively high concentration of inhabitants with dual Polish and German citizenship: 0.6% of the Polish population in total (Census 2002) In the Netherlands, there is some overlap with the
figure for Germany, but the southern regions of Opolskie and Selisian stand out as notable differences. Among migrants to London, the eastern provinces bordering Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine are over-represented, not surprising given the cheap airline fares, which make traveling to the UK and Ireland as cost and time effective as travelling to Germany or the Netherlands. These provinces also constitute what is unofficially known as “Poland B”, the less economically developed and more traditional parts of Poland. Migration to Dublin, on the other hand, is relatively strong from the Krakow region and the central-north Kuyavian-Pomeranian region.

*Figure 10: Over- or under-representation of the regions among the migrants to Germany, the Netherlands, UK and Ireland*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK (London)</th>
<th>Ireland (Dublin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;1.6%</td>
<td>0.8 – 1.2%</td>
<td>&gt;12%</td>
<td>10 – 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 – 1.6%</td>
<td>0.6 – 0.8%</td>
<td>9 – 10%</td>
<td>8 – 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□&lt;0.6%</td>
<td>□&lt;8%</td>
<td>□&lt;9%</td>
<td>□&lt;12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat (2012)

**No relation to unemployment figures – the SCIP survey offers research opportunities**

One of the push factors reported in the migration literature is the economic situation in the country and regions of origin. Relating these factors to the above maps, however, reveals no strong association; for example, 2010 unemployment figures ranged between 7.9% in the Warsaw region and 13% in the region between Warsaw and Krakow. Even more interesting, the least number of migrants originated from central regions like Lodz, Mazovia, where unemployment figures were lowest, and Swietokrzyskie, where they were among the highest. Some explanation other than mere economic conditions is therefore needed, perhaps one related more to migrant life style choices. The SCIP survey offers a valuable opportunity to explore such issues, including the extent to which workers’ migration motives and pre-migration characteristics differ by region of origin.

**Figure 11: 2010 unemployment rates in Polish provinces**

Reference:

More information about the SCIP Project is available at: www.norface-migration.org/currentprojectdetail.php?proj=8

**A survey of the migration strategies of Romanian migrants in Italy and life satisfaction before and after EU accession**

By Isilda Mara and Michael Landesmann

The immigration of Romanians to Italy, first in the context of the 2004 free visa regime and then after Romania’s 2007 entry into the EU, took the form of a massive and continuous migration movement over a five-year period. Whereas the first phase was typified by casual migration and repeated short stays in Italy, the relaxation of mobility restrictions following the 2007 accession led to a steady increase in the number of Romanians migrating to Italy until, at over one million, they formed the largest immigrant community. This abolition of mobility restrictions, together with the more flexible participation in the labour market, mark a potential change in the migration perspectives of Romanian immigrants in Italy, including, for example, a higher preference for permanent migration over a continuous back and forth between destination and country of origin. Hence, in 2011, as part of the joint TEMPO-NORFACE research project with ISMU Milan, a team of researchers at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) carried out a survey investigation of the impacts of the 2004 free visa regime and of Romania’s 2007 accession to the EU. This study focused particularly on how these regime changes have affected the migration plans of Romanian immigrants in Italy, as well as their implications for employment and social inclusion in the destination country. The survey sample
Almost half of Romanian migrants in Italy have indefinite migration plans

The survey addressed all major themes having important policy implications for mobility, temporary or permanent migration, the labour market and other migration experience outcomes, including social inclusion. For instance, in terms of migration plans, migrants were asked about their current and upon-arrival plans, so that the dynamics could be checked over time and before or after changes in the migration regime. The survey results indicate that almost half of Romanian migrants in Italy have indefinite migration plans. The remainder, however, expressed a preference for permanent migration, with long-term migration the next most popular choice and short-term migration the least popular. Interestingly, pre-EU enlargement “planners” – those who maintained similar migration plans over time – tended to show a higher preference for permanent and long-term migration, while post-EU enlargement migrants were more inclined to mid-term and long-term migration. Similarly, pre-EU enlargement “switchers” – those who changed their migration plans over time – modified their plans in favour of long-term and permanent migration, whereas post-EU enlargement migrants switched to mid-term and long-term migration. Pre-EU enlargement migrants were also more likely than post-EU enlargement migrants to switch to the “undecided” group, those with no predefined migration plan. For both groups, however (i.e., pre- and post-EU enlargement migrants), the new “undecided” comprised mostly migrants who, upon arrival, had mid-term and short-term migration plans. Nevertheless, the frequency is lower for the group of migrants who initially planned to stay long-term or permanently, particularly for post-EU enlargement migrants.

Table 1: Share of migrants by stable planners and switchers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Stable planners</th>
<th>Don’t know upon arrival/don’t know currently</th>
<th>Short term upon arrival/short term currently</th>
<th>Mid term upon arrival/mid term currently</th>
<th>Long term upon arrival/long term currently</th>
<th>Permanent upon arrival/permanent currently</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-EU enlargement</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>369</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-EU enlargement</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Switchers</th>
<th>Switched short term (&lt;1 year) to don’t know</th>
<th>Switched mid term (1-5 years) to don’t know</th>
<th>Switched long term to don’t know</th>
<th>Switched permanent to don’t know</th>
<th>Switched to short term</th>
<th>Switched to mid term</th>
<th>Switched to long term</th>
<th>Switched to permanent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-EU enlargement</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-EU enlargement</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study results in general indicate that temporary migration has become a more prevalent choice among post-EU accession migrants, whereas long-term and permanent migration remains the first preference of pre-EU accession migrants. One explanation for this phenomenon is that the 2007 EU enlargement relaxed mobility restrictions and produced a regime of free movement and labour market access that gave migrants more flexibility in choosing and implementing their migration plans. This opportunity may also have induced migrants to refrain from making any concrete plans about the length of time to be spent abroad.

Intentions to stay permanently fall with a rising dissatisfaction with the migration experience

An additional econometric analysis of the determinants of migration planning patterns identified education levels, employment and family related determinants, satisfaction with the migration experience, networks and remittances as strongly affecting the expected length of stay. The results also suggest that it is the younger among planners/switchers who are less/more likely to preserve/change the intended length of stay, and respective estimates for males and females indicate that younger women have a higher probability than men of preferring permanent migration. Female preference for a more permanent stay, however, is also positively affected by family-related variables – for example, migrating with a partner – an effect not found for males.

A subsequent study, which controlled not only for economic but also for social and subjective determinants of well-being, then investigated how life satisfaction during the migration experience affects the preference to stay, return or out-migrate. A higher level of life satisfaction is typical of migrants who prefer to stay longer in the destination country, whereas low levels of life satisfaction characterise those who express an intention to return to Romania or out-migrate to another country. Hence, as dissatisfaction with the migration experience increases, intentions to stay permanently decrease and intentions to return or out-migrate increase.
Immigration and the welfare state: a welfare magnet or fiscal burden

By Assaf Razin and Jackline Wahba

Immigration and the welfare state

Amid concerns that immigrants are draining public finances, public debate on immigration has focused increasingly on the welfare state; most particularly, whether welfare state generosity acts as a social magnet to immigrants. In fact, over the last 20 years, Europe has experienced a surge in immigration, with a much larger fraction of GDP devoted to social expenditure than in other immigration counties such as the U.S., Canada or Australia. At the same time, Europe seems to have more unskilled immigrants, which suggests that generous welfare systems have attracted unskilled migrants. Such an overly simplistic view, however, is obviously naïve. In fact, existing studies find mixed evidence on welfare, partly because the effect of welfare programs on immigration and its composition depends on the policy regime itself; that is, whether migration is free or restricted. Assaf Razin and Jackline Wahba from the CHOICES team therefore adopt a viewpoint yet to be explored, that the generosity of the welfare state may affect the skill composition of immigrants differently depending on the immigration policy adopted.

The effect of migration regime on immigrant skills

In a free-migration regime, the generosity of the welfare state attracts unskilled migrants, who expect to be net beneficiaries of the system but deters potential skilled migrants as net contributors. Hence, the generosity of the welfare state shifts the migrant skill composition towards the unskilled. In a restricted-migration regime, in contrast, native-born voters of all skills opt for skilled immigration because they are motivated by two considerations: how immigration affects their wages and how it bears on the finances of the welfare state. Typically, unskilled immigration depresses the unskilled wage and boosts the skilled wage, whereas skilled immigration does the opposite. From a public finance point of view, skilled immigrants are net contributors to the welfare state, whereas unskilled immigrants are net beneficiaries, which shifts the migrant skill composition towards the skilled.

The EU as a case study

To identify how welfare state generosity affects immigrant skill composition across policy regimes, the authors compare a free-migration regime, represented by free movement within the pre-enlargement EU, with a restricted (i.e., demand driven and regulated) migration regime, captured by immigration into the EU from two other source-country groups, developed versus developing. The researchers standardise cross-country education quality differences using the Hanushek-Woessmann cognitve skills measure.

Although welfare state generosity may affect immigration and its skill composition, immigration itself may influence voters’ attitudes towards the generosity of the welfare state. For example, voters in the host country may boost its welfare system when absorbing high-skilled immigration but curtail it when immigration is low skilled. Such reverse causation is addressed in the empirical analysis.

Finally, because welfare considerations may be one aspect affecting immigrant skill composition, the researchers also control for the differential returns to skills in both the source and host country and take into account other immigration policies on family re-unification, refugees and asylum seekers, which are likely to impact immigrant skill composition adversely.

Welfare state generosity: social magnet or fiscal burden?

The study results suggest that the generosity of the welfare state, although it does indeed adversely affect the skill-composition of migrants under a free-migration regime (the social magnet hypothesis), exerts a more positive effect under a policy-controlled migration regime (fiscal burden hypothesis) even after the differential returns to skills in source and host countries are controlled for. Interestingly, these results hold for both developed and developing countries, although the magnitude is greater for developed countries.

Conclusions and policy implications

The study findings indicate that the type of immigration regime does indeed affect migrant skill composition. When migration movement is free, as in the EU, welfare state generosity attracts unskilled immigrants, but when migration movement is restricted and demand driven by the host country and its voters, immigration tends to be more skilled. These findings may justify reasonable restrictions on access to welfare benefits, such as those imposed by the UK for EU migrants, which are conditional on the payment of contributions.

Reference:

References:


How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration

By Rianne Dekker and Godfried Engbersen

Communication in migrant networks: steering migration

According to the migration literature, globe-spanning networks of migrants and non-migrants serve to stimulate and perpetuate migration. That is, migrants are not mere objects of the macro-processes that steer migration but rather subjects who move selectively between different countries. Because they typically migrate to places in which they already have contacts, migrant networks serve as conduits for information, resources and assistance.

Whereas early migrants kept in touch with the origin country by mailing packages and letters (which often took months to arrive), a recent boom in cheap international calls has turned the telephone into the social glue that connects migrants and non-migrants all over the world. At the same time, online social media provide easy access across a wide range of weakly tied individuals, creating a de-territorialised social space that facilitates communication among geographically dispersed people in migrant networks. In fact, recent studies show that social media serve as an effective structure in migrant networks for the exchange and mobilisation of social capital, thereby creating new opportunities for individual migrants.

As part of the THEMIS project’s aim to close gaps in contemporary theory on migration processes, Rianne Dekker and Godfried Engbersen conducted 90 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with Brazilian, Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The study purpose was to assess whether migrant and non-migrants’ use of online social media in the Netherlands facilitates international migration by changing the infrastructure of migrant networks.

Four functions of social media in migrant networks

The authors’ primary argument is that social media are not simply new communication channels in migration networks; they actively reform the configuration of these networks and thereby facilitate migration. In support of this claim – and despite some limitations stemming from the “digital divide” and the lower trustworthiness of virtual ties, the interview data reveal four relevant functions of social media in migration networks that facilitate international migration:

First, social media enhance the possibility of maintaining strong ties with family and friends. Most particularly, as communication has become less expensive, more frequent and more media rich, it has greatly eased migrants’ lives away from family and friends.

Second, social media enable migrants to build loosely bound networks from which they can gather resources.

Third, as a corollary to networking, social media provide new avenues for consolidating weak ties or even activating latent ties that are available technically but not yet activated socially. These latter may include, for example, potential sources of information on the labour market, legal conditions or other practical issues related to migration or life in the destination context.

Fourth, social media constitute open, low-key information sources with particular advantages over institutional information sources. Above all, besides being official information sources, they host “backdoor” channels conveying streetwise knowledge on migration. This latter can be seen as both a democratisation of knowledge for migrants and a form of silent resistance against restrictive immigration regimes. In fact, our data suggest that the exchange of such information in traditional migrant networks comes with higher risk and less accessibility.

Social media: upcoming alternative communication channels in migrant networks

Dekker and Engbersen provide clear evidence that social media do indeed constitute more than communication channels in migration networks; they actively transform the nature of these networks and thereby facilitate migration. Most particularly, such media facilitate the formation of new contacts and the revival of old ones, thereby providing easy access to an extensive pool of informal information. They thus widen the horizons for aspiring migrants.

In terms of comparative results, the researchers conclude that Brazilian and Ukrainian immigrants use social media more often than Moroccan immigrants, possibly because Moroccan migration to the Netherlands, in contrast to Brazilian and Ukrainian migration, has developed into a large and self-sustaining system. In general, incoming Moroccan migrants can rely on offline networks of existing migrants for information and assistance in their migration process. In the case of Brazilian and Ukrainian migration to the Netherlands, however, no such elaborate offline social support networks exist. In fact, divisions within the migration flows from Ukraine and Brazil to the Netherlands may have prevented such social support networks from even being formed. This latter conjecture suggests an interesting hypothesis for future research – one in line with the theoretical starting points of the THEMIS project – that migrants who cannot rely on traditional migration networks for social support are more inclined to turn to social media networks.

Reference:


Strategies and routes in Brazilian migration to Portugal and the Netherlands: the differential role of social networks

By Masja van Meeteren and Sonia Pereira

Social networks that facilitate migration: towards understanding complex configurations

Although the migration literature includes a well-established body of research on the role of social networks in the constitution and continuation of migration flows across time, studies to date focus mostly on family or community networks and their role in mediating between particular origin and destination areas. This focus on migrant networks, influenced largely by Massey’s theory of cumulative causation, has resulted in a dearth of systematic study on the role of other actors involved in the perpetuation of migratory flows, such as employers or institutions. Moreover, although
much is known about the role of social networks in explaining labour migration, far less is known about the explanatory power of social network theory for other migration forms.

Yet today we are witnessing more complex and diverse migration flows than ever before; flows comprised not only of labour migrants but of other types of migrants whose motivations and actions may be difficult to explain using theories originated in research on labour migration. Moreover, as the Internet becomes more widespread and users can increasingly gain access to all types of migration mediators, those wishing to migrate are likely to use more sources of information and assistance than in the past. As a result, family and community networks may have become less central in explaining the origination and perpetuation of current migration flows and are likely to be increasingly complemented by other agents at different stages of the migratory trajectory. At the same time, both the use of social networks and the types of social networks available may differ in relation to the destination context. What is missing, then, is comparative research that takes such factors into account and strives towards a more contextualised theory of the role of social networks in facilitating migration.

**Studying social networks in Brazilian migration to Portugal and the Netherlands**

Masja van Meeteren and Sonia Pereira of the THEMIS project take a preliminary step towards such an endeavour by developing an understanding of Brazilian migration to Portugal and the Netherlands. In particular, they (i) develop migrant profiles beyond the usual profiles of low-skilled labour migrants and their family members and (ii) identify the diverse social networks that migrants have access to and receive assistance from at different stages of their migration. The key findings of their analysis of data from both qualitative and quantitative interviews with Brazilian migrants in Portugal and Netherlands and qualitative interviews with returned migrants in Brazil clearly reflect the complex patterns of contemporary migrant relationships. In particular, they show that Brazilian migrants receive information and assistance not only from kin or community members but also from nationals of other countries, including the destination country, online-based virtual communities, and institutional actors, all of which contacts facilitate international migration.

They also demonstrate that although social networks play an important role for Brazilians who migrate to Portugal and the Netherlands, their role differs in each of the two destination countries because the migrants to each have disparate migration motives. Brazilians moving to the Netherlands, for example, seek more information and receive more assistance than those migrating to Portugal. In addition, those that move seeking to experience life and culture abroad are less networked than labour migrants and less dependent on contacts to arrange their migration. Students are particularly active users of web-based information in their migration planning, particularly when moving to Portugal. The analysis also reveals that marriages or relationships with Dutch natives give access to different sources of information and assistance than traditionally thought.

**Beyond migrant and community networks and the ‘homogeneous’ migrant: different migrants, multiple agents and differential roles**

The findings of this research not only confirm the relevance of social networks in facilitating migration, they extend existing knowledge by providing a more contextualised understanding of the role of social networks in migration. More specifically, they apply a comparative approach to studying migrants to different destination countries who have different migration motives and the involvement of multiple actors throughout multiple stages of the migratory process.

The unique experiences of the labour migrants studied also demonstrate that it is misleading to consider Brazilian migrants as one large homogeneous group. Rather, whether in pursuit of consumption or self-realisation, given the new space-time flexibilities and globalisation dynamics, the motives involved in the migration decision are many and diverse. Also increasingly complex are the modes assumed in migration organisation and the role of social networks as resources for information and assistance.

Overall, Van Meeteren and Pereira’s work shows that migration scholars need to move beyond the once common interpretation of social networks as based on community and kinship relationships or the “migration industry” to instead consider multiple configurations involving different agents (both in the origin and destination country) at different stages of the migration process. In doing so, they must necessarily expect distinctive patterns for different migrants moving to different places. As a first step in applying such a framework, this comparative empirical research indicates that the study of mechanisms related to the theory of cumulative causation, which to date has focused on migrant networks and labour migration, should be expanded to include different forms of migration and a wider variety of actors. In this way, future research can uncover more of the underlying mechanisms related to the cumulative expansion of migration flows over time.

Reference:


**Migrant remittances and information flows: evidence from a randomised field experiment**

By Catia Batista and Gaia Narciso

Catia Batista and Gaia Narciso from the TEMPO team use evidence from a randomised field experiment with a representative sample of immigrants in Ireland’s greater Dublin area to investigate how information flows matter for remittance behaviour.

**Impact of communication flows on remittance behaviour: potential mechanisms**

To enhance understanding of the role of migration networks and their interaction with information flows in determining remittance behaviour, the researchers ask the following central questions: Why do migrants remit money to their family and friends abroad? How is the value of such
remittances determined, and do information flows matter for remittance behaviour? Using a randomised control trial to evaluate the impact of information flows between immigrants and their friends and families abroad on remittance flows, they test the hypothesis that information flows may increase the value and frequency of remittances via three different mechanisms: First, communication flows may contribute to an increase in the quantity and quality of the information within transnational households, thereby improving migrant control over remittance use. Second, the increased communication flows may lower remittance costs and, through experience sharing, enhance trust in remittance channels. Third, the increased communication flows may stimulate the demand for remittances on the remittance recipient’s side.

Their research contributes to three strands of literature: First, it provides novel evidence on the role of improved information flows as causal determinants of remittances. Second, it expands existing analyses of the relevance of asymmetric information within households, which show that spatial distance and lack of monitoring can affect remittance flows. Batista and Narciso particularise this finding by demonstrating that improving information flows and their quality may indeed increase the magnitude of remittances. Third, it complements recent research on transaction costs and trust in remittance channels as determinants of remittance flows by highlighting the potentially important role of improved information flows as determinants of migrant remittances.

Experimental design and measurement strategies
To quantitatively assess the impact of communication flows on the extent and value of remittance flows between migrants and their networks abroad, Batista and Narciso implement a randomised field experiment in which a randomly chosen fraction of the immigrants in the sample are offered free mobile phone contact with their networks outside the host country over a varying number of months. The remittance behaviour and other characteristics of individuals in the treatment groups are contrasted with those of individuals in the control group (unaffected by the experimental intervention) in order to assess the causal effects of the experiment.

To measure the effects of this experimental intervention, the researchers conducted a representative sample household survey of the immigrant population in Ireland’s Greater Dublin area. The resulting data set includes detailed information on migrant networks before and after migration (both in the host country and abroad) and on the intensity, content and quality of information flows between these immigrants and their networks.

The researchers confirm the existence of a significant experimental impact on the creation of new information flows (both in terms of number of contacts and duration of communication flows) by supplementing the contacts reported in the survey with actual phone company data on the migrants’ contacts.

“Keeping in touch" substantially increases the money migrants send back home
The study results provide clear experimental evidence that increased information flows have a positive impact on different dimensions of remittance behaviour. In particular, they find a small increase in the number of people who receive remittances from the migrants in the sample (extensive margin) but a significantly larger-than-proportional increase in the value of remittances sent (intensive margin). These results persist through a number of robustness checks; for example, controlling for the substitution of calling costs by remittance flows.

The analysis also examines two heterogeneous effects that may throw light on the mechanisms underlying these results: the nature of the relationships between migrants and remittance recipients, and the content and quality of information flows between migrants and their contact networks abroad.

Taken together, Batista and Narciso’s findings highlight the importance of investing in technology that increases the reach and efficiency of communication flows. In addition to other advantageous effects, such an investment may benefit developing countries with substantial emigration stocks by increasing remittances flowing back to the migrants’ countries of origin.

Reference:

Migrant remittances and risk preferences: evidence from a representative immigrant survey
By Catia Batista and Janis Umblijis

The scale and growth of global remittance flows over the last decade has been unprecedented. According to World Bank data, officially recorded remittances to developing countries have quadrupled over the last decade from US$85 billion in 2000 to US$372 billion in 2011, a value three times greater than total official development assistance. Yet, although this significant global flow of money has motivated a great deal of research, the reasons why people send money home are still not fully understood.

Remittances as insurance
Recent research by Catia Batista and Janis Umblijis from the TEMPO team investigates the possibility that, in certain cases, remittances could be motivated by the migrants’ desire to insure themselves against potential negative shocks to their income. Such an assumption seems plausible in the face of existing evidence that networks at home provide financial assistance to migrants in case of negative income shocks in the receiving country and that home networks are able to monitor the migrant’s financial situation through contacts with network members in the receiving country.

Given that the willingness of network members at home to provide financial assistance in difficult times is likely to depend on past remittances from the migrant, the decision to remit can be viewed as insurance against future negative shocks. Despite previous conjecture, however, this self-insurance motive has proven difficult to capture empirically.
Batista and Umblijs therefore adopt a new approach by investigating the self-insurance motive in terms of the established relation between individual risk preferences and the purchase of insurance. Given that more risk-averse individuals have a preference for purchasing more insurance, it is feasible that in the migration context such individuals would remit more if the self-insurance motive were present. Hence, evidence of a statistically significant positive link between risk aversion and money sent home would provide supportive evidence for the hypothesised self-insurance motive.

**Representative survey of migrants in Greater Dublin, Ireland**

This analysis is based on a tailored representative sample household survey of the immigrant population in Ireland’s Greater Dublin area (N = 1,500). Both the survey questions and data collection strategy were carefully designed to ensure a truly representative sample of migrants residing in Greater Dublin, including a representative proportion of illegal and non-registered migrants.

To test the self-insurance hypothesis, the researchers used an experimentally validated measure of risk preferences: asking respondents to invest money in a hypothetical lottery. The survey included a detailed module on remittance behaviour – encompassing a variety of channels and methods of sending money and gifts to social network members in the home country – and collected detailed individual and household information of the migrants in Ireland, as well as key characteristics of the remittance recipients. This unique combination of remittance and risk preference data made it possible, for the first time, to validly test the self-insurance motive.

**Risk preferences and remittances**

The researchers find a positive and significant relation between risk aversion and remittance behaviour: risk-averse individuals are more likely to send remittances home and are, on average, likely to remit a higher amount. Table 2 provides summary statistics comparing the percentage and average amount remitted by risk-averse and risk-loving individuals. As the table clearly shows, a higher share of risk-averse than risk-loving migrants sent remittances home at least once in the year preceding the interview, and among those that did remit, the average value of remittances was higher for risk-averse than for risk-loving individuals.

This positive relation between risk aversion and remittances remains statistically significant even after a range of individual and group characteristics are controlled for. Analysing different groups of migrants also reveals that the relation between risk aversion and remittances is especially significant for money sent to friends (not parents) and for migrants from Africa.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Averse</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>1299</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Loving</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Table shows the percentage of individuals that have sent money or goods home at least once in the last year. ‘Risk Averse’ refers to individuals choosing to invest less than EUR 20,000 in the hypothetical lottery, ‘Risk Loving’ refers to individuals choosing to invest more than EUR 20,000 in the hypothetical lottery. N=1500

**Understanding motives to remit**

To overcome the inherent difficulty of identifying the self-insurance motive, which is an informal channel that can be combined with other remittance motives, this research proposes a new approach: using an individual risk preference measure. The validity of this instrument is supported by the finding that the relation between risk aversion and remittances is most significant for African individuals, an observation that fits with past qualitative findings that social ties between migrants and networks in the sending country are of great importance in a number of African countries. It is also somewhat strengthened by the lack of significance of the risk-remittance link for parent recipients, a possible indication that sending money to parents is motivated more by altruism than self-insurance.

Using this new methodology and unique representative survey, Batista and Umblijs provide clear evidence for the self-insurance motive for remittances. Such an understanding of which remittance motives dominate in which circumstances is important for the design of policies aimed at supporting the flow of money from migrants back to their home countries, an issue whose importance has grown with the scale and positive impact of global remittance flows.

**Reference:**


**New migrants’ religiosity and identity: first evidence from the SCIP project**

*By Claudia Diehl, Matthias Koenig and Peter Mühlau*

Despite growing public and academic attention in Western immigration countries to migrants’ cultural integration, notably their religious practices and ethnic identifications, most quantitative studies on these integrational aspects adopt a group-comparative focus and/or study differences across generations. Although longitudinal studies are available for the U.S. and Canada, few exist for the European context, and practically nothing is known about the initial period of immigrant integration in Europe.

**Religiosity and identity across groups and countries**

One of many topics addressed by the NORFACE-funded survey “Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe” (SCIP) is the changes that occur in migrants’ religiosity and identification during the very early period of immigrant integration. The first wave of data collection for SCIP, which comprises a survey of about 7,000 recent arrivals in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, has already been completed. The second wave,
which includes follow-up interviews one and a half years later with as many respondents as possible, is still under way. Hence, the following discussion reports initial observations on early changes in religiosity and ethnic identifications among newly arriving Turks and Poles in Germany.

The SCIP questionnaire includes a number of relevant items based on established survey instruments but most notably, questions on pre- and post-migration worship attendance and prayer. It also collects information on identification with the receiving country and the country of origin, thereby providing insight into two questions that remain unanswered in the European literature: What are the effects of the migratory event on religious practices among migrants? Does migrants’ pre- and post-migration religiosity affect their patterns of early identification with the receiving country?

Religious decline and religious reorganisation

The SCIP data confirm that newly arrived Poles and Turks display relatively high levels of religiosity even though both groups are somewhat less religious than comparable age groups at home. Nevertheless, the mean scores for worship attendance and prayer are clearly above the average of the rather secular German population. The crucial issue, however, is migration-related changes in migrants’ religiosity.

Although some scholars argue that the migratory event is a traumatic experience that in itself is conducive to greater religiosity, this claim receives little support in recent empirical research on new immigrants in the U.S. and Canada. The SCIP data likewise indicate that both groups of migrants in fact experience a decline in their religious attendance after migration. Nevertheless, this initial decline is more pronounced among Muslim Turks than among Catholic Poles, which may reflect the fact that Turkish migrants have less access to or knowledge about places of worship. This interpretation is supported by the observation that praying declines less than actual attendance at worship.

These findings raise the question of whether the decline in religious participation constitutes a temporary deviation from a habitual pattern that immigrants eventually recapture or the beginning of a long-term assimilation into the secular mainstream of the German receiving society. One preliminary answer to this question is provided by an analysis of the relation between length of stay and migrants’ religious participation, which indicates that different processes may be at work for the two groups under study. That is, whereas attendance remains low for Polish migrants, the attendance levels of Turks seem to slowly recover. Hence, for Turks, a greater initial decrease seems to be followed by religious reorganisation, while for Poles, there is no evidence of resuming (high) pre-migration levels of religious participation.

Religion: a bridge or a barrier to new migrants’ identification with Germany

The second research question addresses whether migrant religiosity is a bridge or a barrier to the migrants’ integration in Germany. According to the SCIP data on early identification with the new host country as a dimension of migrants’ integration process, overall, a high share of both Poles and Turks identify rather strongly with Germany. Nevertheless, at the time of the first interview, identification with the host society was higher among Poles and Turks who had been in Germany longer than among those who had just arrived. The multivariate analysis, however, reveals a notable intergroup difference: frequent religious participation before migration is negatively related to identification with Germany for Turks but not for Poles. The two migrant groups also differ with respect to their religious participation in Germany. For Poles, being religiously active in Germany is associated with higher levels of identification with Germany, whereas for Turks, identification with Germany does not differ between attenders and non-attenders.

Further analyses of the SCIP data, notably those from the second wave, will show whether these patterns can be corroborated and generalised to other dimensions of socio-cultural and structural integration. Hence, although immigrants’ religious participation in the European context may be of little help in accessing the labour market, it may prove quite relevant for early patterns of social network formation and cultural orientation. By providing this novel longitudinal data set on new immigrants in Europe, the SCIP project will help shed light on these hitherto unanswered questions.

Reference:

Ethnicity and occupational outcomes

By Malcolm Brynin

Although it is well recognised that migrant groups tend to integrate into the host society both socially and economically over time, the extent, ease and effects of this integration vary considerably across countries and minorities. Time also alters migrant status so that those who stand out in some way – culturally, visually, linguistically – may be seen as minorities and hence treated differently. This paper addresses the employment outcomes for such groups in terms of whether they suffer a continuing disadvantage or whether this bias is declining. Malcolm Brynin from the MIDI-REDIE team explores this issue using 1993–2008 data from the British Labour Force Survey (LFS) on employees who work at least 10 hours a week and whose wage data are reported.

How have ethnic minorities fared compared to the white majority?

The analysis finds that in 2008, 7.8% of employees were ethnic minorities, up from 3.3% in 1993. This change is not driven by any individual minority; rather, each group contributes a small amount to the total. Over the study period, minorities tend to be generally younger than the White majority, are predominantly London-based, and vary enormously in terms of female employment (with some having larger, some smaller proportions of employed women). On average, most are better educated than the White majority, with 24.4% having degrees compared to 17.3% of Whites.

In terms of current occupational class, the pooled data in Table 3 show that overall, the majority group is less likely to achieve higher service-class positions than the minority
groups as a whole. In the context of manual or less skilled non-manual work, however, White majority group members are far more likely to be in supervisory positions, while minorities are slightly more likely to be in semi-routine or routine positions.

**Table 3: Occupational class by minority status (all years pooled)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher management/ professional</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower management/ professional</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower supervisory</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-routine</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>607,747</td>
<td>31,411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The importance of occupational clustering for the ethnic pay gap**

Having a managerial or professional position, however, does not necessarily mean having a good managerial or professional position in terms of earnings, which are assessed here as the hourly pay gap between minorities and the White majority. This measure takes two forms: a general pay gap regardless of occupation and a gap within occupations. A general gap in favour of Whites may be the result of wage discrimination or the clustering of minorities into lower paid occupations. In the latter case, minorities’ relatively low pay stems from occupational segregation (whether through choice, discrimination or both). An occupational gap in favour of Whites, on the other hand – that is, Whites and ethnic minorities doing roughly the same work – implies more straightforward wage discrimination. Taking the whole period together, in nearly all cases, the pay gap within occupations is more in favour of minorities than the general pay gap. Black Africans, for instance, earn £0.29 per hour less than Whites overall, but within occupations, they earn £0.15 more than Whites. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – the most poorly paid of all minorities – see their negative overall gap improve from £1.17 and £1.92 to £0.65 and £0.70, respectively, within occupations (albeit both still negative). Only in the cases of Indians and Chinese is the occupational gap larger than the overall gap. Over the period of the study, however, both pay gaps worsened for minorities.

**The decline in inequality within and between ethnic minorities**

This analysis reveals considerable inequality within, as well as between, ethnic minorities but also some convergence on both counts over time. Table 4 outlines the percentage of each group earning below £5 per hour (close to the legal minimum wage) in both periods and those earning at least double that, over £10. As the first column shows, four minority groups have smaller percentages of members earning low pay (Black Caribbeans, Black other, other Asian, and other), while two other groups have much higher percentages (Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). Nearly three quarters of employed Bangladeshis are on a very low wage. At the other extreme, wages over £10 per hour, nearly all groups are worse off than the White group, although two groups do marginally better: the Chinese and other Asians. By the later period (2003–2008), the proportion of Whites earning less than £5 per hour falls by nearly 15 percentage points. Similar drops occur for most groups, but now only two are doing better than Whites (Black Caribbeans and Black other). Four groups, however, do have a higher percentage in the better pay bracket, suggesting increasing polarisation within these groups.

**Table 4: Percentage of each ethnic group below and above certain thresholds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993–98</th>
<th>2003–08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; £5</td>
<td>&gt;£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black other</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Can anything be done about ethnic inequality?**

In Britain, ethnic minorities are becoming more equal relative to Whites in education and occupational position but less so in earnings. In fact, the pay situation has worsened, which is of concern. Where improvement does exist, it involves highly educated minority workers able to obtain relatively good, well-paid jobs. In some groups, a large proportion remains mired in poorly paid work, which leads to increasing within-group polarisation. Not all these differences, however, can be attributed to educational differences or wage discrimination (which is often relatively slight within occupations). Rather, the main and continuing problem seems to be some type of occupational closure: minorities simply find it hard to enter more highly paid occupations. This observation in turn suggests that in Britain at least, action against wage discrimination is not enough. Investigation is needed to uncover the reasons that some occupations have very small proportions of minority workers and assess whether this inequality is a matter of majority prejudice, minority preference or even lack of appropriate training. Only when such underlying factors are revealed can policies be successfully designed to address them.

Reference:

Cultural diversity and increased urban buzz

By Daniel Arribas-Bel

Although cities have become playing grounds for competitive behaviour and rapid economic dynamics, in many cities (or urban agglomerations) economic growth is manifested primarily in specific geographic areas that house creative people and innovative entrepreneurs. The advantages of such urban areas can be summarised in terms of three driving forces: economies of density, or colocating of people and activities; economies of proximity, which relate to the benefits of physical or socio-psychological access; and economies of connectivity, related to social capital or network linkages. These classes of external economies explain the booming character of modern cities.

One issue that has received particular attention in the recent urban studies literature is the phenomenon of urban buzz: that is, areas – whether whole cities or urban districts – that are powerhouses of innovation, creativity and unconventional lifestyles. This phenomenon may relate to socio-economic factors, including economies of cultural and social diversity in urban areas, and/or to productivity-enhancing factors that focus on business sector advantages, Hence, urban buzz is by no means uniformly spread over all population groups or areas in a city: its distribution is governed by a clear spiky pattern related to both the nature of the built-up environment and a multitude of socio-economic factors. One of its key characteristics is the ease of communication and information exchange between the different actors: the action of urban buzz resembles the piazza of old Italian cities, a hub in which all activities and communications are concentrated. In the modern context, the “piazza” is essentially the spatial bundling of urban buzz.

Daniel Arribas-Bel, Karima Kourtit and Peter Nijkamp from the MIDI-REDIE team analyse how buzz patterns can be explained and, in particular, how the phenomenon is affected by cultural diversity. Using novel data from social networks, they are able to show a significant and positive effect of the degree of cultural diversity in a neighbourhood on the level of buzz observed in the area.

Measuring urban buzz in the city

As intuitive as the urban buzz concept sounds, measuring and quantifying it is tricky, so the researchers take advantage of a new phenomenon spreading quickly among cities’ creative residents: location-sharing services. These services are online applications with which users, empowered by a location-aware device connected to the Internet (e.g., a smartphone or tablet), can share their geographic position at a given point in time with friends and broadcast it over the Internet. The high spatial and temporal resolution of these data allows the researchers to zoom into a city and precisely identify differences between neighbourhoods. Most particularly, they can draw on data from the social network Foursquare sourced from a previous study conducted at Texas A&M University’s InfoLab.

By combining this novel data set with detailed geographic information on land use and proportions of migrant residents, Arribas-Bel, Kourtit and Nijkamp are able to carefully assess the effect of cultural diversity, defined by country of birth, on the level of buzz in a neighbourhood. The city selected for the empirical application is the municipality of Amsterdam, which offers two specific advantages: First, it has a long tradition of openness and tolerance – historically, offering shelter to a variety of cultures and ethnicities – which has shaped its inclusive character. Second, Amsterdam is sufficiently large, culturally oriented and high-tech savvy to have induced a degree of location-sharing service penetration that ensures meaningful results from using data from these sources to proxy urban buzz.

The effect of cultural diversity on urban buzz and its policy implications

To obtain a proper assessment of the relation between cultural diversity and urban buzz, Arribas-Bel, Kourtit and Nijkamp use spatial econometrics, regression techniques that can handle spatial data by explicitly calculating the geographic distribution of observations. By controlling for the effect of land use and a neighbourhood’s economic function in the larger picture of the city, they are able to isolate these variables from cultural diversity. They can thus address two important questions: Given two neighbourhoods that are equal in every other respect, how does the volume of buzz activity compare if one has a higher level of cultural diversity? What are the expected outcomes of increasing the level of buzz that a neighbourhood attracts by influencing the area’s cultural diversity?

The results are highly encouraging for supporters of cultural diversity: the study finds that more diverse neighbourhoods tend to host higher levels of urban buzz. In effect, the outcomes of the models suggest a positive and statistically significant relation between the two. Hence, the study findings imply that, because of cultural diversity’s positive impact on urban buzz and thus on the wealth-creating potential of urban areas, policy makers should protect and stimulate cultural diversity as a primary characteristic of cities and neighbourhoods.

Reference:
Effects of neighbourhood quality on labour market outcomes of non-Western immigrant men: quasi-experimental evidence

By Anna Piil Damm

Association between high employment rate of acquaintances and job securement

Although using friends, relatives and acquaintances to find a job is a widespread practice, it remains unclear whether all types of contacts are equally useful for informal job searches. According to recent social network theories, the crucial factor is the quality of social connections rather than the number of acquaintances stressed by the “strength-of-weak-ties” hypothesis. Hence, Anna Piil Damm, from the MI3 team, investigates which types of contacts are most useful in the informal search for employment.

In 2006, Damm, in collaboration with the SFI survey, collected information on the social network characteristics of two representative samples: 1,000 Danish natives and around 1,000 first-generation immigrants from each of three countries – Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. According to the survey data, 17% of natives and 26% of immigrants found their latest job through their social network. Damm then linked the 2006 survey information to administrative register information on the respondent’s 2007 employment status (taken from Statistics Denmark) and found that, ceteris paribus, unemployed respondents whose acquaintances have an above average employment rate are more likely to be employed in the year after the survey. The association between number of acquaintances and unemployed survey respondents’ employment probability in the year after the survey, however, is statistically insignificant. These findings suggest that, consistent with recent social network theory, it is the quality of acquaintances that matters for job referral.

Figure 12. SLS estimates of the effects of living in a socially deprived neighborhood and of the employment rate of men living in the current neighborhood of residence.

Note: The effects are estimated for the balanced sample of male refugees 2-6 years after immigration using Danish administrative registers and neighborhood units from the Rockwool Research Unit.
High employment rates of non-Western immigrant and co-national men living in the neighbourhood and labour market outcomes of refugee men 2–6 years after asylum

The fact that 75% of the immigrant respondents in the original survey found their latest job through other immigrants in their social network suggests that non-Western immigrants primarily have contact with neighbours of similar ethnic origin and limited contact with native neighbours. In that case, what matters is not the employment rate of the general population in the neighbourhood but the employment rate of immigrants with similar ethnic origin. Damm’s analysis provides quasi-experimental evidence for this hypothesis.

Specifically, the study finds that quasi-random assignment to a neighbourhood with a relatively high employment rate of men aged 18–60 does not affect labour market outcomes of refugee men 2–6 years after assignment (see Figure 12). In contrast, however, as illustrated in Figure 13, a percentage point increase in the employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18–60 living in the neighbourhood of residence 2–6 years after immigration increases the employment probability of refugee men by 0.2 percentage points. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in the employment rate of co-national men aged 18–60 living in the neighbourhood of residence 2–6 years after immigration increases real annual earnings by 2%. The study interprets these findings as evidence that although employed contacts of non-Western immigrant origin are useful for finding a job in the host country, employed co-national contacts are more useful for finding a job that matches the individual’s skills because only co-nationals know the value of the individual’s education in the country of origin.

Whereas previous research on the spatial dispersal of refugees emphasises the importance of refugee settlement in regions with a low unemployment rate, the findings in Figure 13 strongly suggest that policy makers should also help refugees find housing in neighbourhoods with established immigrant networks because these latter promote positive labour market outcomes for new immigrants. Reforms of spatial dispersal policies for refugees, however, should also be based on empirical research on how the neighbourhood quality affects the socio-economic outcomes of refugee children, a question investigated in on-going research by Anna Pii Damm and Christian Dustmann.

Reference:
The dynamics of ethnic residential segregation in Nordic welfare states: the role of native population

By NODES Research Team

Using mixed methods to study the selective migration behaviour of natives

Issues related to ethnic segregation and integration are highly topical and debated across Europe, with Nordic countries being no exception. Despite the Nordic welfare model – one of equality of opportunity, extensive wealth distribution, comprehensive social policy and universalism – clear socio-economic and spatial divisions have emerged between different ethnic groups in all Nordic countries. The NODES project contributes to the research and general discussion on ethnic segregation by examining the mechanisms and underlying reasons for segregation in the context of Nordic welfare states.

Previous research on neighbourhood choice shows that urban residential mobility is highly selective: households generally end up in neighbourhoods whose population composition matches their own socio-economic, demographic and ethnic characteristics. Hence, studies on ethnic segregation have traditionally placed emphasis on the residential preferences and patterns of ethnic minority groups. Yet there is clear evidence not only that the native majority population has an equally strong preference for living among co-ethnics but also that natives’ selective migration patterns – settling away from immigrant-dense areas – contribute to the emergence of ethnic residential segregation in all the Nordic countries. Moreover, despite a vast amount of research linking neighbourhood ethnic composition to neighbourhood preferences and satisfaction, research into how preferences, perceptions and experiences affect actual moving behaviour is scarce.

As part of the NODES project, a unique survey was designed to explore the motives and rationale behind the actual migration choices of native households in comparable neighbourhood types. This survey, based on the extensive Nordic statistical registers, was administered to four different target groups in the Helsinki, Stockholm and Oslo regions. Each target population was divided into households that had recently moved from one neighbourhood to another (“movers”) and households that have remained in their current neighbourhood for several years (“stayers”) with half of each subsample selected from immigrant-dense neighbourhoods (decile 10). The survey data were then supplemented with register data on household characteristics (e.g., income, education, family type) and neighbourhood features (e.g., socio-economic profile and dwelling stock). The researchers were thus able to compare not only the socio-economic characteristics, attitudes and perceptions of “movers” versus “stayers” but also the influence of ethnicity (ethnic composition or ethnic clusters) versus other neighbourhood characteristics on households’ views and experiences.

Survey respondents were also asked to participate in in-depth interviews probing the themes covered by the survey, and to date, 90 such interviews have been conducted in Finland. These interviews, targeted at, for example, families with children living in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods, as well as those that have moved out of such areas, are designed to throw light on the social meanings and interpretations of the factors that seem most relevant for understanding selective intra-urban migration patterns (e.g., environment for children, social problems, reputation) (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: Percentage of respondents identifying an issue as important (“important” or “very important”) in their decision to leave the neighbourhood

Decile 1-9 movers

- Sweden
- Norway
- Finland

Decile 10 movers

- Sweden
- Norway
- Finland
Flight and avoidance behaviour: does the high share of immigrants explain everything?

Because both economic and demographic factors and housing market structures affect the housing and neighbourhood careers of both natives and immigrants, differences in these features are important for explaining differences in housing outcomes. Nevertheless, according to the results of the NODES project, they do not explain everything: additional explanations are thus needed, possibly related to preferences and discrimination. The survey results also suggest that in Nordic countries, it is viable to study the migration behaviour of native households as a part of the ethnic segregation process. That is, they reveal clear differences in responses on several themes depending on which type of neighbourhood the respondent lived in.

Most particularly, there is clear evidence of flight and especially avoidance behaviour by native households: over a half of the native Norwegian “movers” from Oslo’s most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods cited “too many immigrants” as an important reason for relocating to another neighbourhood (see Figure 14). In Oslo, however, migration decisions are also closely linked to the education market because of a lack of school choice. In addition, the three city regions are in different stages of immigration and spatial segregation development, which probably explains the differences in the motives given in each country. In the Stockholm and Helsinki regions, for instance, about a quarter of the “movers” from the most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods identified “too many immigrants” as an important reason for moving. These figures, however, do not answer the fundamental question underlying the White flight theory: whether the wish to leave the neighbourhood is primarily due to a high share of immigrants or whether there are other more significant reasons.

The research results further show that moves are primarily motivated by reasons related to dwelling, a fact well known from previous studies. Nevertheless, in terms of neighbourhood as push factor, there are significant differences between the most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods and other neighbourhoods. The “movers” from the most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods, for example, were less satisfied with their former neighbourhood than other “movers” and far more likely to emphasise issues related to the social environment (e.g., feelings of insecurity, social problems, uncleanness, bad reputation) as important reasons for leaving. In fact, based on the survey and interviews, it could be concluded that it is not only neighbourhood ethnic composition that affects the moving decision but its overall development in certain areas combined with people's interpretations of the neighbourhood's overall direction of change. For instance, people's satisfaction with the ethnic composition of their neighbourhood tends to go hand in hand with how they view neighbourhood safety: in Sweden, more than half of “stayers” in the most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods who reported concerns about safety, also expressed discontent with the neighbourhood’s ethnic dimension. Measured as an odds ratio, if individuals report being discontented with safety, the odds are 5.2 times higher that they are also discontented with their neighbours’ ethnicity.

Implications of the Nordic model for ethnic segregation

Over recent decades, the viability of the Nordic welfare model has faced several external and internal challenges in the face of increasing socio-economic differences and ethnic diversity that manifest as spatial differences between different population groups. Seen as problematic in relation to a societal model based more on uniformity than diversity, these differences have led to various top-down housing and urban policy measures (e.g., ethnic and social mixing, area-based policies) intended to counteract residential segregation. Both in these measures and in the public debate, however, the emphasis has been on the existence of differences rather than their effects. Yet research indicates that the egalitarian characteristics of the welfare state have notable implications for these effects (e.g., the importance of spatial integration and social mobility). Hence, the empirical findings of the NODES project will provide important insights into the links between the dynamics and effects of residential segregation and welfare state policies.

Reference:


Productivity, wages and task-specific substitutability: the economic impact of migration

By Anett Haas and Michael Lucht

The persistent wage differential in Germany between migrants and natives is but part of an on-going debate about the economic impact of migration on productivity and wages. One explanation offered for the German differential is that migrants and natives choose different jobs because their qualifications and skills are not perfectly substitutable, so they face demands for separate job activities. This phenomenon of “imperfect substitution” implies that migrants do not compete with natives for exactly the same jobs. At the firm level, obviously, companies do differ in productivity level and ability to employ migrants. Taking these aspects into account, Anette Haas and Michael Lucht from the MIDI-REDIE team construct a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition to examine the impact of migrants on average firm productivity, wages and welfare in regions with different agglomeration levels. They assume that firms with a higher share of migrants could realise wage cost advantages. In this model, the heterogeneous distribution of migrants is one source of regional disparities. In terms of firm competition, which firms remain in the market in the long-run equilibrium depends on migrant share: above a certain migrant share threshold, firms only stay in the market if they are highly productive compared to the average firm or able to compensate their lower productivity level by wage cost advantages. In this context, the researchers show, a higher migrant share can explain higher average productivity in a region. Nevertheless, although the relative wages of natives versus migrants increase with migrant share, the welfare effect for workers is ambiguous: the welfare of a native can be lower than that of a worker in a region of the same size with a lower migrant share.
The higher the migrant share, the higher the productivity of firms

The analysis also reveals that a higher migrant share may lead to a higher than average firm productivity level, which could partly explain the existence of regional disparities in that usually the more agglomerated the region, the higher the migrant share. A higher migrant share also leads to a greater wage differential. The mechanism at work here can be described as a firm specialisation effect caused by wage advantages that impose restrictions on the firm structure. In this situation, small firms, which are usually less productive, are under more pressure to exit the market than more productive firms. Accordingly, the number of less productive firms may decrease while the highly productive firms remain in the market even when they do not have access to wage cost advantages. As the model demonstrates, the outcomes depend on the distribution of productivity.

Haas and Lucht thus derive three main conclusions from their theoretical model: First, the higher the migrant share, the larger the wage differential between migrants and natives, an implication confirmed empirically by the fact that wages and wage differences are higher in agglomerated regions, which are typically characterised by a larger migrant share. Second, a less productive firm is more likely to employ migrants because wage advantages and productivity act as substitutes, so less productive firms that cannot acquire wage advantages by employing migrants are forced to exit the market. Third, there is a positive relation between migrant share and firm productivity.

Why employ both migrants and natives? – Evidence for task groups

A closely related empirical study by the same authors analyses migrant performance in the German labour market and its dependence on the tasks carried out in their jobs. Even in the absence of discrimination, imperfect substitutability between migrants and natives in the same task is a possible reason for persistently lower wages. Hence, Haas and Lucht investigate the elasticity of substitution between migrants and natives with various qualifications, laying special emphasis on the occupational task dimension. Adopting a theoretical framework in which migrant shares vary with qualification, task categories and experience, the researchers argue that the influence of differences in migrant versus native worker abilities depends on job requirements. As a result, substitution elasticities of an aggregate production function can be quite different for different job cells. They thus also estimate elasticities of substitution for different aggregate CES-nested production functions for Germany between 1993 and 2008, again taking into account the task dimension. They find significant variation in substitutability between migrants and natives across qualification levels and tasks and show that interactive tasks especially seem to present hurdles for migrants in the German labour market.

When qualification- and task-specific elasticities of substitution are estimated using German social security data from the IAB, migrants and natives turn out to be perfect substitutes in some task groups but imperfect substitutes in others. Which activities they are perfectly substitutable for depends on qualification level: the medium qualified are imperfect substitutes in interactive tasks; the highly qualified, imperfect substitutes in routinized tasks (both manual and analytical). Obviously, insufficient language competence – a disadvantage in interactive tasks – does not restrict migrants’ job opportunities across all skill groups per se; hence, requiring language course participation, albeit useful for the less educated, may raise superfluous barriers for highly qualified workers. On the other hand, language-dependent disadvantages for foreigners may decline in the future if the non-native population’s proportion grows, international trade connections expand and an increasing number of firms use English as a business language. Additionally, in the case of the imperfect substitutability of highly qualified workers engaged in manual and analytical routine tasks, it is supposedly not insufficient language competence that drives their involvement but specific occupation-related certificates, degrees and regulations. The researchers therefore see major challenges ahead for governments in the European Union to further harmonise such requirements to facilitate the integration of highly qualified foreign workers into the labour market.

References:

Determinants of attitudes towards immigrants and their role in integrating ethnically diverse societies

By Tiitu Paas

A study by the Tartu University team of the MIDI-REDIE project aims to identify the possible determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants, dependent on both personal characteristics and individual attitudes towards the socio-economic security of households and a country’s institutions. The overarching purpose of the study is to provide empirical evidence-based grounds for policy proposals that, through the integration of ethnically diverse societies, can create a favourable “people climate” that supports future economic growth. Based on the formulated aims, this paper focuses on the attitudes of Europeans towards immigrants, relying on information provided in the European Social Survey’s (ESS) fourth round database.

Theoretical framework for analysing the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants

Although the theories that explain the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants are diverse, they can be generally divided into two groups: individual theories that place emphasis on such individual drivers as educational level, personal income, employment status and cultural conflicts, and collective theories that focus on aggregated variables like the number of immigrants in a country or level of unemployment growth rate. On the individual level, micro-economic theory suggests that individuals with less economic security (i.e., with a lower level of education, lack of skills, lower level of financial resources) tend to have more intolerant attitudes towards immigrants.
However, other determinants of such attitudes are possible that may be better explained within a more interdisciplinary theoretical framework. This analysis therefore adopts such a framework to develop a set of explanatory variables with which to estimate regression models that explain the variability in individual attitudes towards immigrants. These models, however, also capture the country-specific determinants proceeding from collective theories by including country dummies in the estimated regression models.

**Empirical results: the primary determinants of attitudes towards immigrants**

The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with several theories explaining individual and collective determinants of attitudes towards immigrants. Ethnic minorities, urban residents, those with higher education and higher income and/or work experience abroad are generally more tolerant of immigrants in Europe, as are those whose attitudes to socio-economic risks are lower and those who evaluate a country’s political and legal systems and police force more highly (i.e., have political trust). A respondent’s labour market status (employed, unemployed), on the other hand, has no statistically significant relation with attitudes towards immigrants. In addition to personal characteristics and attitudes, however, attitudes towards immigrants can also be influenced by collective determinants that depend on country-specific conditions (measured here by country dummies). These country-specific conditions include the number of migrants in the country, the composition of the migrant group, country size, the country’s historical and political background (path-dependence) and the level of economic development (per capita GDP). In sum, Europeans’ attitudes towards immigrants vary depending on (i) respondents’ personal characteristics, (ii) their attitudes towards the country’s institutions and socio-economic security and (iii) country-specific conditions.

**Attitudes towards immigrants in the Baltic States: small countries with an ethnically diverse population**

The Baltic States, small post-socialist countries that joined the EU in 2004, offer a particularly interesting case for analysing attitudes towards immigrants in that the share of minorities in their total populations is remarkable (40.7% in Latvia, 32.3% in Estonia and 16% in Lithuania) while the share of new immigrants is small (0.2–0.4% in Latvia, 0.3% in Estonia and 0.3–0.5% in Lithuania). Although the attitudes of Baltic States peoples towards immigrants follow the overall European pattern dependent on their socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes towards a country’s institutions, for this subsample, country-specific conditions play a particularly important role. In general, such attitudes are more positive in all three Baltic States if the respondents (i) have more positive attitudes towards the country’s political institutions, (ii) are younger and (iii) were born outside the country of current residence. Overall, however, Latvians and Estonians are less tolerant than Lithuanians, but in Estonia, improved tolerance is related to higher education, whereas in Latvia and Lithuania, it is associated with higher income and/or higher socio-economic security. In not one of the three countries does experience working abroad improve attitudes towards immigrants.

**Immigration policies: the UK and Sweden**

Sweden and the United Kingdom, whose 2008 populations include 13.9% and 10.8% foreign-born individuals, respectively, offer two successful but different examples of how Europe can manage migration. Although neither country has imposed any restrictions on labour from new EU member states at accession, the regression results suggest that attitudes towards immigrants in both countries vary greatly. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (see MIPEX III, 2011, www.mipex.eu), Sweden has the best migration integration policy in the world, whereas British immigrant integration policies are significantly weaker. At the same time, because of its cultural diversity, the UK receives a high percentage of highly skilled newcomers looking to work in metropolitan centres such as London, which are characterised by the presence of multi-national companies and few language barriers. This diversity makes it relatively easy for foreigners to find a niche. Yet negative attitudes towards immigration from the UK respondents indicate a threat of increasing tensions in this multi-national society that could have a negative impact on future economic growth.

**Implications for policies to improve attitudes towards immigrants**

Overall, the research results suggest that supporting the integration of ethnically diverse societies requires the implementation of policy measures that improve attitudes towards a country’s institutions and socio-economic situation. An additional package of measures should include the creation of supportive conditions for labour mobility, the improvement of human capital, and the positive portrayal of multi-cultural activities in the media.

**Reference:**

A new panel data set on international migration by gender and educational attainment

By Herbert Brücker, Capuano Stella and Abdeslam Marfouk

The brain drain and the importance of its gender and time dimensions

Because economic theories recognise the decisive role of human capital for growth and development, the “brain drain” – the loss of a highly educated labour force through migration – has been the focus of a large body of theoretical and empirical literature. It is also of major concern to policy makers in those countries (especially the least developed) thought to be suffering most from this phenomenon. Quantifying the magnitude, determining the causes and evaluating the consequences of the brain drain, however, is contingent on the availability of reliable data on international migration. Hence, since the late 1990s, research on this topic has frequently been coupled with major data collection.

Such collection efforts, however, even in the face of a rising female share in international migration, have paid little attention to the gender dimension of the brain drain until the recent release of new data sets documenting the structure of international migration in OECD countries by gender, country of origin and educational level. This data source, which measures these variables both in stocks and as a percentage of the source countries’ labour force (emigration rates), sheds valuable new light on the magnitude of the brain drain by gender. It shows, for example, not only that women’s participation in international migration has increased over time but that skilled women exhibit higher emigration rates than skilled men.

These observations raise several important questions: How has this trend evolved since 2000 and which countries have been hit hardest in absolute and relative terms by the brain drain in recent years? During which period(s) has the brain drain intensified? How has skilled female migration developed over the last decade? Unfortunately, not all of these questions can be answered immediately because no data sets are available beyond 2000. Nevertheless, in the hope of eventually answering these queries and fostering original research on the gender aspect of the brain drain from a dynamic perspective, the IAB team of the TEMPO project has developed a new data set that extends the existing data timeline. Specifically, it provides figures on the stock of international migrants to 20 OECD destinations from 1980 to 2010 (in five years intervals) by country of origin, gender and educational attainment. This longitudinal data set thus enables researchers to analyse these three brain drain characteristics using advanced panel techniques.

The IAB brain-drain dataset: overview

Primary data sources: The national censuses and population registers of the destination countries.

Destination countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.

Definitions:

Migrants: foreign-born individuals living in each of the OECD destination countries considered, except for Germany for which the data refer to citizens.

Educational levels: 1) low: less than a high-school diploma 2) medium: a high-school diploma or equivalent; 3) high: higher than high school.

Table 5: Shares of total world migration covered by the IAB brain drain data set (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total migration UN*</th>
<th>Total migration IAB (2013)</th>
<th>IAB % of total world migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>99,275,898</td>
<td>38,797,015</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>111,013,230</td>
<td>44,841,784</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>155,518,065</td>
<td>54,162,175</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>165,968,778</td>
<td>65,319,456</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>178,498,563</td>
<td>75,893,825</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>195,245,404</td>
<td>87,657,207</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>213,943,812</td>
<td>96,731,708</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Taken from the United Nations Population Division, Stock of International Migrants

Table 6: Shares of female migration captured by the IAB brain drain data set (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total female migration UN*</th>
<th>Total female migration IAB (2013)</th>
<th>IAB % of total female migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>46,884,139</td>
<td>19,198,268</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>52,364,718</td>
<td>22,311,810</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>76,385,633</td>
<td>27,095,805</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>81,761,249</td>
<td>32,607,430</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>88,256,349</td>
<td>38,055,684</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>96,074,285</td>
<td>43,886,824</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>104,794,962</td>
<td>48,359,759</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Taken from the United Nations Population Division, Stock of International Migrants
Preliminary findings: the evolution of highly skilled female migration and the gender composition of the brain drain

The following figures outline the most recent evolution of female migration by skill level. According to Figure 15, which shows the variation in male and female migration between 1980 and 2010 by skill level (low vs. high), over the last four decades, female highly skilled migration has increased more than male highly skilled migration, but the exact opposite has occurred for low-skilled migration.

Likewise, as shown by the Figure 16 illustration of female migration share by skill level over the same period, whereas the female component of highly skilled international migration was just above 40% in the 1980s, by 2010 the highly skilled pool of international migrants was made up almost equally of males and females.

It is apparent that further research is needed to investigate the forces driving the above trends, to determine, for instance, whether migration policies in the host countries or education policies in the source countries might play a role in shaping female international migration. The data collection effort described here will without doubt enhance the possibilities for increased understanding of the on-going migration phenomena.

Figure 15. Variation in number of migrants by gender and skill level, 1980–2010 (in %)

Source: IAB brain drain data set (2013)

Figure 16. Share of females in international migration stock by skill level (in %)

Source: IAB brain drain data set (2013)

Reference:
Usefulness of an integrated system for estimating migration flows

By James Raymer and Arkadiusz Wiśniowski

Statistical models are needed to estimate international migration

Accurate and consistent migration data requires direct communication between national statistical offices. The best international migration data in the world come from the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which not only have excellent and well-developed population registers but are unique in regularly exchanging information on international migrants and notifying the sending country when someone from another Nordic country registers on their system. A person can thus only be included on one population register at a time. All other national statistical offices in the world, in contrast, rely on their own systems and measures to track migration flows from and to their country, resulting in inconsistencies and inaccuracies for the user community. Hence, until national statistical offices exchange information on migrants, statistical models are needed that reconcile the different reported figures on migration and estimate the missing data.

An integrated framework for modelling international migration

The IMEM approach to harmonising and estimating migration flows differs from previous methods in its emphasis on modelling the measurement aspects of the reported statistics and providing measures of uncertainty for all flows and parameters in the model. Adopting a Bayesian approach in the context of international migration flow estimation has two major advantages: First, the methodology offers a coherent and probabilistic mechanism for describing various sources of uncertainty in the various modelling levels, including the migration processes, models, model parameters and a priori knowledge. Second, it provides a formal mechanism for the inclusion of expert judgment to supplement deficient migration data.

The conceptual framework of the model developed by the IMEM team to estimate international migration flows is presented in Figure 17. The primary objective is to estimate a set of unobserved true migration flows based on four pieces of information: flows reported by the sending country, flows reported by the receiving country, covariate information and expert judgments. The reported data are harmonised via two measurement models: one for sending country data and one for receiving country data. These models, however, distort the true flows by taking into account the duration definitions used in various countries, the relative accuracy of the data collection mechanisms and the overall undercount of migration and coverage. Hence, a theory-based migration model is used to augment the measurement model and estimate the missing flow data.

Figure 17: Conceptual framework for modelling migration flows

In situations of weak and inconsistent data, the inclusion of expert judgements is essential for improving the estimation and reflecting uncertainty. Hence, the IMEM team sought to provide the best possible estimates and measures of uncertainty by including expert judgements as an input in the statistical model. After two rounds of the Delphi survey, the researchers found that (i) experts often disagreed on the effects of various measurement aspects, especially on undercount of emigration (see Figure 18), and (ii) the feedback from the first round did not lead to any significant changes in the opinions from the second round. This uncertainty is reflected in the estimates and represents an important assessment of the quality of the data collection systems across Europe.

Figure 18: Expert answers for undercount of emigrants
The IMEM model provides a mechanism for communication and assessment of migration data

The IMEM project has made four important contributions to current knowledge. First, it has created a methodology for estimating international migration flows that directly accounts for the main differences in the measurement aspects of reported data. Before this study, even though different measurements of migration flows were obviously producing very different patterns, little was known about the effects of measurement and error, and no one had attempted to model the differences by considering the main aspects of duration, undercount, coverage and accuracy. Second, it has combined a measurement model with a migration model in order to bring together the reported data, covariate information and expert judgments. The estimated flows are thus consistent with the United Nations recommendation for the measurement of international migration. Third, the estimated flows also include measures of uncertainty, which can be used to assess the quality of the reported flows. This latter is important for clarity about the accuracy of the estimated figures when combining data from different sources and accounting for missing data. Finally, the team has produced a consistent and complete set of estimates that can be used by the wider community, an especially relevant tool given the 2004 and 2007 expansions of the EU. Most especially, the results can be used to inform policy and improve the evidence base; for example, the estimated net migration totals, when compared with those published by Eurostat, suggest that the official population totals for the whole of the EU and EFTA are likely to be about one million too high on average for the years 2002–2008.

Producing reliable statistics on international migration flows requires a consistent cross-national framework. The IMEM framework could provide just such a basis for countries working together and sharing information on population movements. It could also prove useful for incorporating inconsistent or incomplete data obtained under different data collection systems. Since the procedures and methodology for data exchange would take time to organise and develop, however, it is unrealistic to expect all countries to share information on migrants in the short term. Therefore, statistical modelling should be adopted to harmonise and estimate the flow data. As national statistical offices communicate more effectively, the accuracy of the estimates will improve. It is nevertheless likely that statistical models will still be required to capture some features of the migration measurement processes, such as accuracy of the collection system or undercount.

References:


